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PROPOSAL 
The victorious Sandinistas and their governing junta stood on the 
threshold of a Nicaragua eager to be transformed form the exploited, 
dependent, and terribly poor nation-state it had been virturally since its 
independence from Spain into a truly new society based on popular will and 
welfare. After a decade of governing with this goal in sight, however, the 
Sandinista government led by President Daniel Ortega was defeated in the 
1990 elections. I will examine this electoral defeat as the last in a series of 
setbacks that prevented a revolutionary society from emerging. I will 
attempt to demonstrate how it was that despite the overwhelming support of 
the Nicaraguan people, substantial foreign assistance, and a clear policy 
agenda, the Sandinistas failed. I will also attempt to explain that failure as 
a result of their inability to withstand a sustained armed civil conflict, and 
of their inability to diversify their monoclutural economic system to break 
their historic pattern of dependency. 
INTRODUCTION: A BRIEF HISTORY OF NICARAGUA, 1933 - PRESENT 
The United States Marines occupied Nicaragua almost continuously from 
1912 to 1933. In order to insure the continued internal stability of the 
small, agrarian' country, they left in their place the commander of the 
U. S. -trained National Guard, Anastasio Somoza Garc{a. 1 His authoritarian 
rule would continue until his assassination in 1956, followed by another, 
more brutal dictatorship under his son, Anastasio Somoza Debayle. It was 
under his regime that the leftist opposition born in Nicaragua's countryside 
evolved into the revolutionary movement known as the Sandinistas. Deriving 
their ideological foundations from both the Cuban revolution and from the 
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popular revolutionary leader, Augusto Ces~r Sandino, the Sandinista 
movement gradually gained wide support among the vast majority of 
Nicaragua's large agrarian population and urban workers throughout the 
1960's and 70's. Following a huge mobilization of the revolutionary forces, 
the Frente Sandinista de Liberaci6n Nacional (FSLN) finally took power in 
1979, forcing Somoza to flee the country. 
The decade that followed was, in large part, the result of the FSLN's 
attempt to produce a total social and political revolution consistent with their 
vision of a more equitable Nicaraguan society. The new marxist government 
instituted sweeping reforms in the economy and the government, and 
pursued aggressive policies to attack a number of the nation's serious social 
and economic problems. After ten years under the revolutionary regime, 
however, Nicaragua remained plagued by many of the same problems that had 
inspired the armed opposition against Somoza. The FSLN was, in fact, 
defeated in the elections of 1990 and replaced by the more centrist 
government of Violetta Chamorro, a long-time leader of the opposition to the 
revolutionary government. Her administration, however, faces most of the 
same challenges the Sandinista government unsuccessfully confronted. 
The Somozas 
The u. S. hoped to accomplish three objectives in establishing the 
National Guard: to replace Nicaragua's old army and police with a central, 
well-trained and well-equipped military force; to establish internal order; 
and to make the military a non-political force with the task of preserving a 
constitutional government and free elections. 2 Although the second objective 
was by far the most vital to U. S. policymakers, the third is particularly 
ironic in that the Guard became perhaps the most politicized entity in 
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Nicaragua throughout both the Somoza regimes. The installation of Somoza 
in 1933 marked the beginning of a long and violent family dynasty, committed 
only to enhancing and preserving the power of the Somozas through 
unprecedented oppression and corruption. 3 After the 1932 elections, 
supervised by occupying U. S. forces, Somoza Garda was named to the post 
of Jefe Director of the National Guard, which had quickly evolved into the 
most capable army Nicaragua had ever had. Somoza would soon utilize its 
forces as his personal instrument of domestic political oppression. 4 By 
February of 1934, he had already ordered the assassination of Sandino, thus 
eliminating the largest obstacle to his recent ascension to power. Though 
there are conflicting accounts and interpretations concerning Sandino's 
assassination, Somoza--whether reluctantly or with great conviction, ordered 
the murder to be carried out by members of the National Guard. 
By 1937, Somoza Garc{a had been officially inaugurated as the President 
of Nicaragua, thus beginning a forty-two year era of authoritarian rule and 
tyranny. During his first term, Somoza began consolidating his power and 
increasing his own wealth at the expense of the national treasury and the 
nation's poor. His personal holdings, which soon reached into both the 
industrial and agrarian sectors, combined with his influence over the 
command of the Guardia formed an immensely profitable personal network 
between the government, the economy, and the military. 5 The President was 
also able to recognize and take full advantage of the shift in 
U. S. - Nicaraguan policy to one of non-intervention. The reluctance of the 
Truman administration to interfere with the Somoza inner circle facilitated his 
ascension to, and consolidation of supreme political and economic power. 
When his term as President was due to expire in 1947, Somoza selected 
Leonardo ArgUello to be his successor on the Liberal Party ticket. Following 
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a fraudulent election administered and overseen by the National Guard, 
Argiiello was installed as President. Determined to assert his authority and 
prove he was no puppet, however, Argiiello tried to make staff changes 
among the Guard officers without notifying Somoza. Less than one month 
later, he was deposed and replaced by the dictator, thus establishing a 
pattern of illegal succession that would characterize Somoza rule in the years 
ahead. B Such an overtly anti-democratic maneuver, however, left 'the U.S. 
government no choice but to withhold diplomatic recognition until 1948, when 
it recognized the government of Somoza's uncle, Victor Manuel RomB:n y 
Reyes. Consistent with the trend of the previous decade, Somoza again 
assumed the presidency when Ro~n y Reyes died in May 1950, less than 
one year after giving up the post. 7 
The dictator moved swiftly to insure the continuation of his rule, 
seeking renewed military aid from the U. S. in 1951. By 1953, Nicaragua had 
negotiated such an agreement with the U.S. whose policymakers had been 
convinced that Communists in Guatemala and Costa Rica posed a serious 
threat to Central American security. Somoza Garc{a skillfully used his 
strategic position to gain special military, economic, and political concessions 
from the U. S. government, and carefully maintained close personal 
relationships with key members of the State Department until his 
assassination in 1956. 
Luis Somoza, who was the President of the Nicaraguan Congress, 
assumed the presidency upon his father's death and appointed his younger 
brother, Anastasio Somoza Debayle as commander of the National Guard and 
of the Air Force. B The two brothers would continue to rule what had 
become their personal fiefdom until Luis' death in 1967, by which time the 
younger Somoza had simultaneously achieved the presidency and command of 
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the Guard. 9 The worst corruption and brutality of the Somoza period then 
began to characterize the socio-political system. Somoza Debayle was 
determined to remain in power and to retain his position of wealth. He 
maintained both through blatant fraud and literal elimination of any political 
opposition via the National Guard. Like his father, "Tachito" carefully 
cultivated personal relationships with U. S. officials. Despite the atrocities 
of his government, he was ever-mindful of maintaining the friendship of the 
Unites States, and in particular, the State Department.'o 
The 1970s, however, proved to be a decade of change in Nicaragua that 
would finally bring about the fall of the dynasty. In 1974, Somoza declared 
a state of siege after a successful hostage operation by the Sandinistas that 
humiliated the government and the National Guard. The crack down included 
complete press censorship and the unleashing of the Guard on the 
Nicaraguan population. What ensued was nothing short of a reign of terror 
that marked the beginning of Somoza Debayle's fall from power." After the 
1974 hostage incident, opposition to the dictatorship grew steadily, setting 
off a brutal cycle of opposition and repression cUlminating in the 1979 
Sandinista victory in what had become, by that time, a full-blown civil-war. 
The Sandinistas 
The FSLN was founded in 1962 by Carlos Fonseca Amador. With support 
from Cuba, its explicit intent was to overthrow the Somozas through a revolt 
fashioned after the 1959-1960 removal of Fulgencio Batista by Fidel Castro 
and his followers.'2 Soon after the FSLN's founding, many of its 
Cuban-trained guerrillas were diffused throughout the countryside to gain 
the support of local peasants and to mobilize them.'3 The Nicaraguan export 
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economy had long been at the mercy of international markets. The landed 
aristocracy whose estates produced export commodities experienced cyclical 
booms characterized by major opportunities for employment, followed by 
recurring market declines resulting in mass unemployment and starvation for 
farm workers and their families. '4 The FSLN appealed to the needs of these 
peasants, and to urban workers who were desperate for an end to the social 
and economic vulnerability and political repression resulting from Somoza 
rule. Their aspirations proved to be the foundations for armed struggle 
against Somoza and the National Guard that led to his overthrow. '5 
Following the Sandinista victory, in accordance with the FSLN National 
Directorate (DN), a junta was established as the formal, provisional 
governing body. '6 This body faced the enormous task not only of literal 
reconstruction of the country, but also of restructuring the entire social, 
economic, and political environment in accordance with the goal of 
broad-based, popular participation in national policy. The Sandinistas 
instituted far-reaching, innovative reforms in education and health care. 
The economy was redesigned and reoriented toward revolutionary ends, while 
it sought to maintain the cooperation of the traditional middle sectors. 
Despite significant gains in literacy, medical facilities, women's rights, and 
human rights, as the decade of the eighties drew to a close, the "new 
Nicaragua" appeared to have failed to materialize and the Sandinista 
government was defeated in the nation's first ever free elections.'6 
Nicaragua's Future 
Violeta Chamorro and her government inherited a Nicaraguan state and 
socio-economic system in a state of total crisis. Its gross national product 
had, in fact, experienced a negative growth percentage rate every year 
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after 1983, and the national treasury was nearly depleted. 19 The masses of 
people who had been disappointed by Sandinista economic failures now looked 
to Chamorro with a new, if somewhat skeptical, hope for socio-economic 
relief, a monumental task virtually impossible to achieve given Nicaragua's 
staggering foreign debt and utter lack of resources. 
In addition to economic recovery, the new government also faced, like 
the Sandinistas before them, the task of rebuilding the entire social system 
after years of civil war and foreign intervention. Tens of thousands of 
armed Nicaraguans, both Contra· and Sandinista, remained a volatile element 
present in almost every area of the country. The diffusing of such a 
potentially violent armed forces had to be carried out within the context of 
transition from the military government of Daniel Ortega and the FSLN to the 
civilian government of the Chamorro UNO coalition. It thus had to be 
performed cautiously, with little room for error. 
In short, the Nicaraguan socio-political system inherited by Chamorro 
closely resembled that won by the Sandinistas over a decade earlier. She 
too, set out to eradicate the many social and especially economic problems for 
the people of her country. Although there were pledges of significant 
international support for her government only hours after the UNO victory 
was announced, the legacy of foreign intervention, particularly by the U. S., 
had to be overcome. Most importantly, despite economic reforms instituted 
by the Sandinistas, Nicaragua's economy remained heavily dependent on two 
major export crops to earn the hard currency it needed to import finished 
goods. Confronted with such obstacles, .the rapid growth that so many 
* The term "Contra" is an abbreviated form of the Spanish word for the 
counterrevolutionary forces in Nicaragua. 
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Nicaraguans had come to expect under the Chamorro government is simply 
not likely to materialize. 
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PRE-REVOLUTION NICARAGUA THROUGH 1979 
Social Climate 
Perhaps the most glaring legacy of the Somoza dynasty was the 
miserable social climate in which the majority of the Nicaraguan people lived, 
particularly the rural poor. As is often the case in highly centralized 
authoritarian systems in which only a handful of elites hold the largest 
proportion of political and economic power, the Somoza inner circle amassed 
immense and unprecedented wealth, while thousands of people were denied 
even the most basic needs for survival. While the Somozas dined with U. S. 
State Department officials, children starved to death in the streets of 
Managua and in the fields of the cotton plantations. Education was 
chronically inadequate; illiteracy rates were high even by underdeveloped 
nations' standards, and high numbers of Nicaraguans had no access to 
schools of any kind. Serious shortages of medical facilities and supplies 
produced both high infant mortality rates and a low life expectancy. In 
fact, Nicaragua ranked at or near the bottom of all Latin American countries 
for social statistics throughout the Somoza period. 
Nicaraguan society under the Somozas was a deeply traditional and, 
therefore, highly unequal one. As with the great disparities between the 
quality of life for urban and rural citizens, workers and elites, men and 
women held very different social roles and were afforded quite different 
levels of justice within it. This was, of course, largely attributed to the 
concepts of marianismo and machismo, so prevalent in all traditional Latin 
American cultures. Within the boundaries of the role of women under the 
concept of marianismo, the Nicaraguan woman, regardless of class, simply 
did not possess the same legal rights as did her male counterpart. Women of 
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all classes and backgrounds were legally subordinate to fathers or husbands, 
while being expected to live by different moral standards that diminished 
Nicaraguan men's legal and moral responsibilities, consistent with the 
machismo concept. In a moral code closely tied to the beliefs of the Roman 
Catholic Church, women were charged with upholding the morality of the 
family and were responsible for its spiritual development and well-being. 
Conversely, men were largely exempt from this duty and were not legally 
bound to support their families financially or to acknowledge and support the 
children they fathered 'out of wedlock. 
The result was a high rate of male desertion that left large numbers of 
female-headed households living in poverty without any legal means to 
require male financial responsibility.' Married women working in rural areas 
did not even receive the income they earned as wages, farm workers being 
paid to the male head of a household for the work done by all members of 
his family. 2 While adultery was strictly forbidden on religious and social 
moral grounds for women, it was usually overlooked in the case of men. 
Illegitimacy carried a serious social stigma for both mother and child, 
regardless of socioeconomic status. Advertising was blatantly sexist, with 
virtually no legislation to regulate the industry in existence. 3 Overall, 
Nicaraguan women during the Somoza years were less educated, had fewer 
financial resources, were concentrated in less-skilled, lower-paying jobs, and 
had fewer civil and legal rights than men. 
The health care system for the majority of Nicarguans was miserably 
inadequate under the Somozas. Most Nicaraguans had extremely limited 
access to sanitary drinking water and medical attention. The average life 
expectancy was 53 years and the infant mortality rate was 120 per 1,000 live 
births. 4 The availability and quality of medical care was, like many other 
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basic provisions, very unequally distributed between different segments of 
the population. Throughout the Somozas' rule, institutionalized health care 
was virtually absent in most areas of the country. Residents of the rural 
areas typically had to travel for hours to reach even the most basic medical 
attention. Although access to and quality of health care was somewhat more 
adequate in urban areas, hospitals were almost exclusively located in cities. 
Rural dwellers, especially the poor, were left without even emergency 
medical attention. 5 The facilities that were in existence were operated at 
chronically low levels of efficiency and tended to be staffed with patronage_ 
employees and administrators far more concerned with their relationship to 
the Somocista elites than for the people to whom they were to provide care. 
Medical institutions competed with each other for the few resources that were 
allocated by the Somoza government, usually at the expense of their 
patients. B The generally poor quality of Nicaraguan health care is perhaps 
most plainly obvious as demonstrated by the fact that members of the Somoza 
family elite travelled exclusively abroad for medical attention. In fact, when 
ISomoza GarCIa was fatally shot in 1956, he was flown immediately to aU. S. 
hospital in the Canal Zone. 7 
Like health care, public education for the vast majority of Nicaraguans 
under Somoza was either highly inadequate or non-existent. Again, those in 
urban areas had better access to educational facilities than their 
counterparts in the countryside, but even in cities scarcely one half of the 
population was literate. In rural villages, illiteracy was over 80 percent. B 
During the last decade of Somoza rule, education policy completely ignored 
rural Nicaragua and was hardly a priority in the cities. The disparity 
between urban and rural education is painfully obvious from the demographic 
statistics for the 1970s. Over two-thirds of all students were from urban 
11
 
backgrounds, while less than five percent of all children from agrarian 
backgrounds even finished primary school. 9 Higher education existed solely 
to educate the elite children who were fortunate enough to attend the very 
limited numbers of Nicaraguan colleges, most of which were structured to fit 
the business interests of the Somocistas. Most wealthy students, however, 
were educated in the U. S. and trained to uphold the traditional military and 
economic power structure of their homeland. 
Such gross neglect of domestic education was not a random omission on 
the part of the Somoza government. Denying access to education to the 
middle classes and, especially to the unskilled urban and rural poor was 
highly functional in maintaining the dictatorship in a position of supreme 
power and preserving its complete domination of Nicaragua's political, 
economic, and social life. >0 Education of the large number of Nicaragua's 
workers presented a serious threat to the traditional order of the country. 
It was, in fact, by design that the Somoza regime provided very little public 
education, the assumption being that the uneducated posed less of a threat 
to the status quo. n Illiteracy, therefore, served as a means to insure the 
passivity of the poor and to provide Nicaraguan elites with a large pool of 
unskilled labor that was crucial to the agroexport economy on which they 
depended. Such an education system created generation after generation of 
poor, illiterate, landless workers who were dependent on the coffee and 
cotton plantations for securing employment and survival. >2 
The Roman Catholic Church had always played an important role in the 
social development of the Nicaraguan social system. Under the Somozas, the 
Church did not operate as a single, cohesive unit with a unified policy. In 
fact, its position changed significantly throughout this period. This change, 
in part, was a result of the dual nature of its structure; that is, its two 
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elements: the Church hierarchy and official Church, and the so-called 
people's Church. The former consisted of the bishops who decreed official 
policy for their respective dioceses; the latter encompassed parish priests 
and laypeople who worked and lived with the largely poor congregation. 
The official Church was historically the more conservative, in the sense that 
its position virtually always reflected a desire to maintain the status quo. 
The "popular" Church, on the other hand, became increasingly more 
concerned with social justice and providing for the needs of its members in 
as self-sufficient a manner as possible. This policy shift occurred gradually 
during the century between independence from Spain and the installation by 
the U. S. of the Somoza dynasty. 
Consistent with the traditional dual-hierarchy characterization, the 
official Church was generally supportive of the Somoza governments which 
subsequently allowed traditional ecclesiastical officials considerable influence 
within society. >3 This relationship had its historical beginnings in the 
post-Independence alliance between the Church and the Conservative Party, 
which agreed to protect Church privileges within Nicaraguan society. >4 
Although the Somozas were powers within the Liberal Party, their 
arrangement with the bishops was the same. The Church, which held a 
monopoly on religion and social influence for the masses, contributed 
important political endorsements for the dictators in exchange for political 
favors and concessions from the Somoza government. The bishops complied 
absolutely with the government of Somoza Garc{a and therefore were allowed 
to continue exercising control over religious instruction, their influence over 
many social laws, and the ownership of substantial property. >5 Because 
Somoza Garda did not impose traditionally liberal anti-clerical measures on 
the Church, it was simply in their best interest to support his regime. This 
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mutually beneficial relationship continued with the governments of the 
younger Somozas until 1970, when Church support began to erode and, 
ultimately shifted to a position of active opposition.'s 
The Vatican II Council and the Alliance for Progress provided the 
Church with the inspiration to pursue social change for Nicaragua. Members 
of the people's Church had long been engaged in attending to the social 
needs of their congregations; needs which had grown more and more 
desperate as Somoza rule wore on. With the spark of support from the 
bishops, however, the movement of laypeople for social justice gained 
considerable momentum.'7 Soon the Church hierarchy recognized that the 
Somoza regime, and the economic system perpetuated by it, represented the 
structural bias responsible for the oppression and starvation of the majority 
of Nicaraguans. Although Church opposition to Somoza was not unanimous, 
as some bishops were, in fact, fearful of challenging the dictator, its 
members provided a significant and critical support to the movement that 
brought down the dynasty.'8 
Economic Climate 
The Somocista political economy played an important part in producing 
the vast inequality and deprivation that characterized the country. 
Throughout its history, as today, its economy has been completely dependent 
on agricultural exports to survive. This largely unregulated monocultural 
system was responsible for an extreme polarization in Nicaraguan society. 
Almost all productive land was held by a tiny percentage of the popUlation 
who in turn required a large cheap labor pool in order to profit from the 
production of export crops. Such a system also insured that landed elites 
retained and expanded their holdings from decade to decade. 
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Somoza Garda was installed as the head of the National Guard at the 
height of a world depression that produced nothing short of economic 
collapse. Coffee, sugar, and banana prices plunged on the world market in 
the early 1930s, leaving the country destitute and without its only sources 
of revenue. The landholding exporters subsequently increased cultivation of 
their crops in order to compensate for decreased revenues, a behavior 
pattern which resulted in a further decline in prices. 19 Smaller landholders 
were pushed off their lands by plantation owners as arable land became more 
and more concentrated into the hands of upper class elites. 
During World War II, economic activity was accelerated somewhat as the 
Allies' demand for raw materials boosted aggregate export income. This in 
turn, however, created an overwhelming dependency on the U. S. market to 
import its goods. 20 As the war drew to a close and the demand for these 
materials vaporized, Nicaragua again plunged into a recession that lasted for 
the remainder of the decade. Somoza's answer to these economic troubles 
was a temporarily successful diversification of export agriculture and a huge 
increase in cotton planting during the 1950s. Under the Alliance for 
Progress from 1962 to 1970, with a huge infusion of economic aid from the 
.United States and international lending institutions, the economy experienced 
a period of substantial growth in terms of production and development. 21 
Its overall trade figures increased at an annual rate of ten percent during 
the 1960s, and its level of dependence on cotton and coffee declined as a 
result of limited diversification. 
The decade of the 1970s, however, brought economic problems that 
could not easily be dealt with, and which were intensified by the internal 
turmoil surrounding the growing revolutionary movement and its repression 
by the Somoza government. Following the 1972 earthquake that devastated 
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Managua, the country began a period of heavy foreign borrowing that would 
continue and in fact accelerate until the fall of Somoza by which time the 
debt had reached $1.15 billion. 22 During this period, the economy moved 
through cycles of significant gains to intense lows, accompanied by high 
unemployment and inflation. Between 1972 and 1979, when it became evident 
that the Sandinistas were close to victory, total productivity had decreased 
by 25 percent and the inflation rate had reached more than 80 percent. 23 
The boom and bust cycles that characterized the economy under Somoza 
were most apparent in the agrarian sector, and during most of the period of 
the dictatorship, in coffee cultivation and its performance on the world 
market. Coffee was its single largest industry in terms of employment, land 
under cultivation, and proportion of the gross domestic product. 24 Despite 
several attempts to introduce other crops for diversification, Nicaragua 
continued to rely on coffee for the capital it needed to import finished 
goods, a state of affairs which only served to solidify its position as a 
dependent raw-materials exporting nation-state. 25 
During the 1950s however, the Nicaraguan agricultural sector, as did 
those of other Third World countries, experienced an unprecedented cotton 
boom. In a successful attempt to increase his personal wealth by means of 
exploiting the then high prices on the world market, Somoza Debayle 
increased cotton production by 120 fold by 1955, when the extent of its 
cultivation reached a peak of 40 percent of the country's cultivated land. 26 
The world cotton price proved to be extremely profitable for the Somoza 
family and Nicaragua's other landholding elites while, at the same time, it 
was devastating for the small farmers displaced by the boom and left without 
employment after it had ended. After the cotton period ended, the 
16 
agricultural sector again turned to coffee as its main focus, while investing 
some resources in beef, tobacco, and sugar as well. 
Nicaragua had remained self-sufficient in basic food crop production 
until cotton was introduced for large-scale export. After this period, as the 
population inexorably increased, food crop production decreased, and by the 
mid-1950s, the country was forced to import food to feed its population, 
setting off a rapid acceleration of foreign debt in the late 1950s. This 
policy, however, proved to be very beneficial for Somoza and his elite circle 
of agricultural producers who were able to increase their landholdings and 
profit from the increased export revenues. It was, however, financially 
crippling for the small farmers and rural workers who were at the mercy of 
the export economy for their income, and who were forced to pay higher 
prices for imported food that could have been grown on Nicaraguan soil. 27 
Agricultural sector behavior, therefore, was a clear example of how the 
self-serving policies of the government produced the exploitation of the poor 
and working classes of the country and set off wildly fluctuating cycles of 
prosperity and depression in the overall economy. 
The state of the industrial sector, like the rest of the nation's 
economy, was subject to the rural, agricultural peaks and recessions that 
characterized the Somoza period. Although industry employed far fewer 
workers and contributed much less to the nation's income than agriculture, it 
became an important economic force in the more populous, urban areas of 
IManagua and Leon. Its significance increased in the 1950s, particularly 
when Somoza Debayle began to take a personal interest in industry and 
manipulated industrial policies so as to increase his own wealth. Although 
its contribution to Nicaragua's GDP was hardly marked, the industrial sector 
quickly became an important national concern when Somoza began acquiring 
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industrial properties to offset the losses he incurred during the recession of 
the late 1950s. 28 Others of his personal friends did the same, buying 
factories in the cities and temporarily boosting the industrial sector. This 
injection of capital investment in industry had important implications for the 
urban working class which grew significantly during, this period. 
The Alliance for Progress brought new capital resources to the Latin 
American nations and spawned the Central American Commom Market (CACM), 
and both developments contributed to the growth of the Nicaraguan 
industrial sector. Increased capital allowed construction and improvement of 
factories, light industry, and other mechanized operations. The CACM 
provided a new and large market for Nicaragua's agricultural exports and, 
therefore, increased activity in the industrial processing of those goods. 29 
Following this period of growth, however, a recession settled in across the 
region throughout the 1970s. The financial burden fell most heavily upon 
the members of the newly developed industrial working class, the majority of 
whom were concentrated in urban industrial centers where employment 
became increasingly difficult to secure. This situation intensified as the 
Somoza government continued to impose policy favorable to agricultural 
elites, to the detriment of the working class. 30 These policies only 
contributed to the ever-increasing inequality between the economic classes. 
The result was the growth of volatile labor unrest, manifest in periodic 
strikes that led to violent oppression by the National Guard, particularly 
after the Sandinista movement had gained momentum. In the industrial 
sector, therefore, as in agriculture, the policies of the Somoza dynasty 
ultimately inspired the mass mobilization and armed insurrection that brought 
down the dictator. 
18 
The personal wealth of the Somoza family, within the context of 
Nicaragua's dependent and underdeveloped economy, cannot be accurately 
measured. Although he was of humble beginnings, Somoza Garda amassed 
his fortune while serving as Jefe Director of the National Guard. His 
moneymaking techniques generally involved the granting of political 
concessions for bribes and other similar means of exploiting his position. 
Through such business transactions, Somoza developed important 
relationships with both domestic elites and foreign investors with whom he 
would collaborate to push Nicaragua's economy further into a state of 
dependency.31 Somoza Garda also extracted wealth from thriving Nicaraguan 
gambling, prostitution, and other illegal activities, receiving bribes in 
exchange for preventing the national police from interfering with them. In 
addition to these and other illegal ventures, Somoza was also involved in 
several legitimate businesses, including agricultural cultivation and 
production, industry, infrastructure development, and mining. Few areas of 
the economy with profit earning potential escaped his attention, and by the 
1940s, he was one of the wealthiest men in Nicaragua and in fact, in all of 
Central America. 32 Somoza then used his tremendous power within the 
government to write himself and his inner circle secret loans to finance 
additional industrial projects. By 1945 his fortune had grown to almost $60 
million. 33 
Luis and Anstasio Somoza Debayle were born into the most powerful 
family in Nicaragua, and were socialized in this advantageous position, and 
taught to preserve it at all costs. Like their father, the Somoza brothers 
cultivated relationships with key domestic and foreign economic players to 
insure a continued successful cooperative effort for personal gain. When 
Somoza Debayle officially assumed power after Luis death, he continued to 
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enforce regulatory legislation that eliminated competing companies from 
infringing on his economic operations. He was able to use his virtually total 
governmental power to channel into his personal bank accounts millions of 
dollars in foreign relief funds after the Managua earthquake disaster in 1972. 
These funds were then used illegally to fund reconstruction efforts that 
generated even more graft and profit for his family and coterie of friends. 34 
According to some sources, before his fall from power in 1979, Somoza 
Debayle's annual income was estimated to be between 40 and 50 percent of 
Nicaragua's gross domestic product. 35 The Somoza family fortune became the 
most obvious and blatant example of the economic exploitation, dependency, 
and disparity of the period. 
Political Climate 
Prior to 1979, the Nicaraguan political structure was designed to 
maintain the interests of the elite circle of the Somozas and their supporters. 
As was the case in the national economy, the dictator and his allies enjoyed 
absolute control of an extremely centralized government apparatus comprised 
of the executive bureaucracy, the Nicaraguan Congress, and the armed 
'forces, particularly the National Guard. Key positions in each branch of the 
government were occupied only by the closest of friends and loyal political 
allies, preferably a family member, in order to insure that the decisions of 
the officials would be consistent with the Somozas' agenda. 36 Although the 
Somozas were the de facto government authority from the time the U. S. 
Marines withdrew from Nicaragua in 1933 until the Sandinista revolution 
46 years later, a Somoza did not consistently hold the title of President 
throughout the entire period. Somoza Garc{a held the position of Jefe 
Director of the National Guard, a post which was technically subsumed under 
the governmental powers of the President, Juan Bautista Sacasa. Through a 
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series of extralegal political maneuvers and the manipulation of key positions 
within the command level of the Guard, Somoza was soon able to exercise his 
own- political agenda over President Sacasa's faint objections. 37 He finally 
ousted Sacasa in 1936 and had himself declared President, thus 
simultaneously controlling both the government apparatus and the military. 
His three sons all served as commanders in the Guard promoting their 
father's policies through any necessary means. This system of family control 
of both formal governmental and military power centers continued and 
expanded during the regimes of the younger Somozas, although they did not 
consistently hold the title of President throughout the entire period. 
During this era, as had been the case throughout most of Nicaragua's 
history, the government experienced the power struggles between the Liberal 
and Conservative parties as most citizens and nearly all elites were affiliated 
with one of the twO. 38 Unlike a conventional democratic two-party system, 
however, the Nicaraguan government structure was controlled almost 
completely by the party of the current dictator, while the other served the 
opposition until it gained power. This system was characterized by constant 
conflict, divisions, and weak coalitions built around the personal interests 
and relationships of socio-economic elites. The Somozas were members of the 
Liberal Party and it was under their control that this traditionally 
personalistic political organization gained absolute power at the expense of 
those who did not identify with it. 39 
Loyal members of the Liberal Party benefitted from the same fraudulent 
elections that maintained the Somozas in control of the presidency. 
Congressional officials appointed Liberal judges and filled the ranks of the 
bureaucracy with those individuals most likely to remain compliant with their 
policies and political interests. Most of the ideological base for the two 
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parties, however, had deteriorated into an incohesive elitist clustering of 
personal cliques by the time of the 1933 installation of Somoza Garda. 40 One 
notable exception was the periodic presence of young members of the 
Conservative Party who became active in the party hoping for political 
change. Most of these reformist Conservatives, however, were exiled, 
imprisoned, or isolated by these party leaders who feared being associated 
with any opposition to Somoza. 
Although the Conservative Party was ineffectual under Somoza Garc{a, 
it regained some of its former influence during the presidency of Lufs 
Somoza and later under Somoza Debayle. After his fraudulent election to the 
presidency, Tachito sought to appease the Conservative faction by giving 
them 40 percent of the seats in the National Assembly; a small concession 
given that the Assembly exercised little real authority. 4' Overall, both 
Liberal and Conservative Parties,. like the government structure as a whole, 
remained the personal, political organizations of the privileged elites, and to 
some extent, the bourgeoisie, but remained insulated from the concerns and 
participation of the masses. 
When Somoza Garc{a moved to the forefront of Nicaraguan politics as an 
influential member of the Liberal Party, all hopes for maintaining the National 
Guard as an apolitical institution were dashed. Instead, the military became 
the Somozas' principle vehicle for consolidating and maintaining political 
power and eliminating the opposition. Because the position of top command 
was always held by a members of the Somoza family, its actions were 
guaranteed to support the dictator in the interest of self-preservation. 42 
This also insured that plots against them would remain at the rank-in-file 
level, and therefore easily be extinguished. Somoza Garda carefully 
garnered the unconditional psychological and emotional support of his 
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Guardsmen by providing them with equipment, training, and salaries, and by 
assuring them that their loyalty would be rewarded. His use of the Guard 
to repress his political opponents, employing extreme violence against often 
innocent people, served to alienate its members from the civilian population 
that grew to hate Somoza's military establishment. Their isolation from 
virtually all non-military Nicaraguans left them utterly dependent on the 
Somozas and forced them into a stance of unquestioning defense and loyalty 
at all costs." 3 
The National Guard was given duties in all areas of the government 
and, in fact, continued to expand its jurisdiction throughout the Somoza 
period. They were responsible for the postal service, immigration and 
emigration, all imports of military hardware, national sanitation, all 
communication media, the administration and oversight of elections, and the 
very broad duty to maintain internal security..... In addition to legal 
activities, the Guard was also actively involved in regulating and collecting 
the profits from the Somozas' wide and lucrative network of gambling, 
prostitution, and political corruption. Its first priority, however, was to 
keep power concentrated in the dictatorship, and eliminate all internal 
opposition to it. Repression by the National Guard increased under Somoza 
Debayle, who faced increasing internal opposition to his authority following 
his brother Lu{s' death in 1967."5 In a futile attempt to remain in power, 
he was forced to employ unprecedented violence against opposition from any 
and all levels of society. As his enemies continued to gain support for his 
overthrow, only his Guardsmen remained loyal in the hopes of maintaining 
their own position. 
In the late 1960s the effects of over three decades of dynastic 
domination became increasingly visible with the rise of the popular leftist 
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movement of the FSLN. In addition to the traditional opposition sources-­
elements of the press, university students, and outspoken members of the 
bourgeoisie--Somoza Debayle was confronted with increasingly frequent 
uprisings by urban and rural workers demanding change. The FSLN 
movement began with a series of clandestine operations modeled after those 
of Sandino's and Castro's guerrillas, increasing to the point that Somoza 
imposed a state of siege in 1974. 46 
Opposition growth accelerated both within Nicaragua and abroad. 
Honduras served as a site of guerrilla bases for Sandinista camps, and Cuba 
continued to provide training for strategists and field commanders, as well 
as limited material assistance. Even the United States, the long-time friend 
and supporter of the Somozas, tapered off its substantial economic aid as 
human rights abuses worsened. Domestic opposition came from scores of 
organizations including labor unions, political parties, and the popular 
Catholic Church. 47 Perhaps the single most powerful event that mobilized 
Nicarguans against Somoza was the January 1978 assassination of La Prensa 
editor Pedro Joaqu{n Chamorro, a long-time opponent of the dictator. As 
the masses demonstrated in the streets, this action by Somoza compelled 
many middle and upper class Nicaraguans to publicly call for his removal. 46 
By January 1979, the dynasty was on an irreversible course to its 
demise and political and economic elites began to flee the country in fear of 
a victory by the revolutionaries. Although membership in the National 
Guard had reached an all-time high of 14,000 soldiers, the revolutionary 
forces had grown far too large to be contained. 49 The FSLN launched its 
"Final Offensive" in June 1979, covering key urban and rural areas and 
quickly defeating the declining number of Guardsmen who were left to fight 
in vain. Somoza Debayle fled Nicaragua on July 17, the remnants of the 
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Guard quickly surrendered to FSLN forces, and Sandinista Nicaragua was 
born. 
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NICARAGUA UNDER THE SANDINISTAS 
Social Conditions and Policy 
When the military junta of the newborn Sandinista government arrived 
in Managua in July of 1979, they brought with them the hopes and 
preliminary plans for the "New Nicaragua", to be the result of a total social, 
economic, and political revolution. As victorious civilian revolutionaries who 
had taken up arms against Somoza raced through the streets elated at the 
prospect of real change, members of the governing junta could not have 
imagined the tremendous task that lay before them. The scars of the 
decades of military dictatorship, the insurrection, and oppression ran deep, 
and although the military battle had temporarily subsided, the complete 
reconstruction of their country was at the forefront of their agenda. 
Countless cities and villages had been destroyed leaving thousands of 
Nicaraguans homeless and without employment. Economic production had 
virtually ceased, as many of the farm workers were fighting the battles of 
the insurrection's final days. Scarcely one half of the population was able 
to read about the Sandinista victory and starvation was still a reality for 
thousands in urban and rural areas alike. 
Despite these overwhelming internal obstacles to progress, the FSLN 
met perhaps its greatest challenge in 'opposition from the government of the 
United States. In the face of diplomatic and economic sanctions, then 
outright military action, however, the Sandinistas attempted to maintain a 
general policy of non-alignment. They did develop close ties with Cuba and 
courted officials of the Soviet Union, always insisting that their 
revolutionary aims were not expansionist. Their major objectives, in truth, 
were related to the domestic needs of Nicaragua, and by the mid-1980s, the 
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government simply did not have the resources for military expansion because 
of counterrevolutionary activity within Nicaragua's borders. Their explicit 
goals in 1979, therefore, were to erase as completely as possible the 
despotism and exploitation of the Somoza period in favor of popular 
democracy based on mass political participation and national unity. 1 
The FSLN's social policy was perhaps its most powerful vehicle for 
producing change and, thus, represented its most successful endeavors. 
Social service investments in 1980, in fact, accounted for 33.6 percent of the 
government's total expenditures, and would remain at that level through 
1984." In addition, despite the degree of challenge presented by 
Nicaragua's intense social problems, the new government had the benefit of 
overwhelming support from is people for their new programs. The 
Sandinistas hoped to develop social programs which would channel support 
for the revolution into a thorough national mobilization effort. In a 1970 
speech delivered by Carlos Fonseca Amador, the FSLN's objective was to 
"achieve a profound change in their conditions of life. 'I" 
In terms of financial investment, the immediate improvement of health 
care was the Sandinistas' highest priority. In terms of statistics, the 
Somoza record was atrocious and major public health improvements became 
the specific target of the revolutionary agenda. 4 Health care policy, which 
was directed toward a vast expansion of preventative medicine and 
mass-based health education, was administered by the newly created Ministry 
of Health. This department was the first of its kind in Nicaragua's history, 
responsible for all health programs, facilities, personnel, and education. 
Capitalizing on wide popular support, the government program enlisted the 
. assistance of the people themselves for administration of a national 
immunization campaign. This effort included vaccinations for polio, measles, 
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and malaria that reached an estimated 85 percent of its intended patients and 
resulted in a drastic reduction in these infectious diseases." In addition to 
bringing health information to the public, FSLN policy also made strides in 
institutionalized medical education. New training programs and medical 
schools were established to attempt to produce a dramatic increase in the 
number of medical personnel available to staff the few existing health care 
facilities. By 1985, the number of students enrolled in medical school was 
ten times that of 1979." In order to improve curative care, the new 
government instituted a program to dramatically increase the number of 
hospitals and medical clinics, another method of utilizing popular support. 
Volunteer workers assisted in the construction of such facilities and the 
transportation of the medical supplies they were able to acquire. Although 
new FSLN government programs were limited in scope by scarce domestic 
financial resources and inadequate humanitarian assistance from abroad, its 
achievements were possible because Sandinista health care programs had the 
overwhelming support of the Nicaraguan people. 
This support proved crucial to Sandinista accomplishments of the in 
health policy. By virtually every health care index, Nicaraguan capabilities 
improved dramatically within the first five years of the regime, and certainly 
by the late 1980s. 7 The number of health care centers grew from 177 in 
1977 to over 600 by 1985. The infant mortality rate dropped from 120 per 
1,000 live births in 1976 to 74 per 1,000 in 1982. Previously widespread 
diseases like polio and malaria had been all but eliminated, with very few 
cases reported annually. S Strong efforts to provide greater access to safe 
drinking water and improved sanitation were equally successful, leading to 
the distribution of over four thousand latrines. Over 250 facilities for oral 
rehydration and nutrition were set up, treating over 100,000 young children 
28
 
and drastically reducing the number of child deaths from thirst, the 
ingestion of contaminated water, and starvation. 9 So successful were these 
programs in bringing about change that the World Health Organization named 
Nicaragua a "Model Nation in Health Attention" in 1983.'0 Overall, 
Sandinista health care policy provided a fine example of real progress toward 
revolutionary change and improved the quality of life for its people. 
Although it did not receive nearly as much financial support as health 
care, education was recipient of more popular support from volunteer 
workers than any other Sandinista policy. The National Literacy Crusade 
was the first and most important education policy of the revolutionary 
government. Literacy had been a major theme in the FSLN's proposed plan 
for a "new Nicaragua" and was closely tied to their notion of a fundamental 
liberation for all Nicaraguan citizens. U Ignorance and illiteracy had been a 
major instrument of control for the Somozas and a painfully difficult social 
problem for the Sandinista leaders. Their initial plan, built around the 
active nation-wide promotion of the Literacy Crusade, involved the 
mass-mobilization of citizens at the grass-roots level to do nothing more than 
to teach other Nicaraguans to read. This collective effort was executed 
under the direction of the Ministry of Education. >2 The Literacy Crusade 
served two major functions: First, it provided a means for illiterate 
Nicaraguans to participate more actively in the revolution and become more 
productive members of society. Second, it allowed the pro-FSLN messages to 
become firmly entrenched in the beliefs of the people by teaching them to 
read using Sandinista literature. 
Nicaraguans both in the cities in and the countryside were bombarded 
with propaganda calling for them to join the Crusade, and thereby created 
an important sense of nationalism for the participants. They were made to 
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feel that they were not only improving themselves, but contributing to the 
overall development of their country as well. Volunteers became members of 
the Popular Literacy Army (EPA) which was comprised largely of high school 
and university students who had embraced the ideology and spirit of the 
revolution and popular participation. The most intensive portion of the 
Crusade lasted five months and required a tremendous effort and commitment 
both on the part of the organizers and participants as well.'3 It involved 
sending urban student-teachers out into rural areas, often into remote areas 
of the countryside to conduct classes in makeshift schools, churches, or 
outdoors. 
The second phase of the education policy called for the establishment of 
a system of education to accommodate the newly literate population. The 
National Education Consultation began where the Literacy Crusade ended. It 
was designed to reform, restructure, and expand the nation's educational 
system.'4 These goals involved primarily increasing the. accessibility of 
education to all Nicaraguans free of charge. The Ministry of Education 
implemented plans for school construction, the expansion of existing 
facilities, and an increase in the number of teachers and classes. In 
addition to expansion, the Sandinista policy also made provision for changing 
school curriculum to fit the technical needs of post-Somoza society. Through 
these structural changes, schools were expected to educate citizens about 
more productive methods in farming and industry, thus improving the labor 
force and the overall economy. '5 The Sandinistas recognized the correlation 
between ignorance and exploitation, illiteracy and underdevelopment, and 
formed an education policy designed to remedy these traditional problems, 
viewing it as a social investment in Nicaragua's future.'B 
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As was the case with health care, the Sandinistas made great progress 
through their well-organized and highly supported education policy. 
Illiteracy was reduced dramatically from over 80 percent in 1979 to 12 
percent by 1981. The number of students enrolled in institutionalized 
education grew from less than 300,000 in 1979 to over one million only ten 
years later. > 7 The Literacy Crusade itself became an umbrella program that 
enlisted several smaller organizations into a highly functional network of 
volunteers for other social programs. Because of these efforts, Nicaragua 
was awarded the UNESCO Literacy Prize in 1980. >8 The education programs, 
despite their great proven successes, were stifled by the onset and growth 
of the civil war with the Contras. Perhaps because their Crusade did make 
such significant progress, teachers and schools, particularly in the rural 
areas, became the target of Contra aggression and destruction which 
seriously hampered the success of the FSLN's mass-based education policy. >9 
Improving the social position and legal rights of women was a major 
Sandinista goal, beginning with the announcement of its Historic Program in 
1969. It was the Program's expressed intent to eliminate the systematic, 
traditional discrimination practiced against Nicaraguan women, promote 
equality among the sexes, and incorporate women into the revolutionary 
government. 20 Such a profound change required a struggle not only against 
pre-revolutionary law, but also against traditional, conservative social and 
religious targets as well. Sandinista leadership realized that the process of 
emancipating women would not be completed through the simple passage of 
laws; women had to be fully incorporated into the male-dominated society as 
moral, physical, and intellectual equals. In this respect, Sandinista 
accomplishments in women's liberation came long before the 1979 victory. 
The most substantial change came through their participation in mobilization 
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efforts of the revolution, particularly their presence as combat personnel in 
the Sandinista popular army. It is estimated that 30 percent of the FSLN 
combat forces were women. 21 Beyond their initial mobilization during the 
revolutionary insurrection to overthrow Somoza, Nicaraguan women were 
mobilized in large numbers for the Literacy Crusade and the health campaign 
in 1980-81. Their emancipation came quickly due to the fact that they were 
not viewed as an auxiliary force in the military struggles, but as integral 
and necessary for the success of the revolution's goals and objectives. 22 
The integration of women into society became solidified as they developed 
into a major component of the new armed forces, and founded the Nicaraguan 
Women's Association (AMNLAE). This organization, which became a 
nationally visible player promoting egalitarian values between the sexes 
within their society would never have been possible in the Nicaragua of the 
Somozas. 23 
In addition to their promoting the social elevation of women, the 
Sandinistas also implemented revolutionary legislation to in order to secure 
equal rights for women. The Provision Law of 1982 made all adult members 
of the family unit legally liable for maintaining it; that is, for providing it 
with the income necessary to survive. Its intent was to combat high rates 
of male desertion that left large numbers of female-headed households without 
the means to provide for them. To further the ability of women to secure 
an income, legislation was passed that required employers to pay each of 
their adult workers individually, prohibiting the traditional practice of 
paying only the male head of the household. 24 The Sandinista government's 
support of equal rights legislation served to reinforce the trend toward the 
social and economic equality that had begun during the 1970s. FSLN policy 
on women's rights was wholly consistent with their revolutionary aim to build 
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a new country based on "the logic of the majority", correctly assuming that 
"the majority" had to include Nicaraguan women. 28 As a result, women 
continued to hold positions of command in the armed forces and leadership 
positions in the government, labor unions, grass-roots organizations, and 
businesses. 
Economic Conditions and Policy 
Despite the economic chaos inherited from Somoza, the junta members 
established themselves in Managua optimistically armed with a well-detailed 
economic plan to reconstruct and revitalize the economy. Every sector and 
industry had been devastated by the end of the insurrection. Sandinista 
policy had to address four basic economic dilemmas. First, the 
infrastructure required major repair of the damage inflicted by the war and 
an administrative reorganization was needed to direct that repair effort. 
Second, policymakers with very limited public resources were under pressure 
to provide relief in the face of massive food shortages and extremely high 
unemployment with fairly limited resources. Third, economic conditions 
mandated the payment on or renegotiation of Nicaragua's enormous external 
debt. Finally, the expressed aims of the revolution called for the 
construction of an entirely new economic system. 28 
Nicaragua's foreign debt in July, 1979 was measured at $1. 65 billion, 
most of which was owed to the United States for agricultural, industrial, and 
military imports. The loss of human resources was equally great as 50,000 
Nicaraguans representing two percent of the total population had died in the 
revolution, and another 100,000 had been wounded. 3D The United Nations' 
estimates of the cost of infrastructure repair and restoration of industrial 
capital damaged in the war was $481 million-a cost which appeared even more 
prohibitive for reconstruction in light of Nicaragua's $1.5 billion flight of 
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capital by the end of 1979. 31 The GDP fell concurrently with the wave of 
decapitalization that followed the insurrection, eventually dropping to 1962 
levels. The productive land so vital to the overall economy remained 
concentrated into the large plantations that had been operated by landed 
elites, a significant number of whom remained in the country after the fall of 
Somoza. As a result, the most comprehensive portions of the revolutionary 
program were directed at the agrarian sector. 
The greatest challenge to marxist economic policy is the paradox of land 
distribution and productivity; a problem that immediately confronted the 
Sandinista leaders. Because many campesinos and migrant farm laborers had 
fought in the anti-Somocista insurrection, poor rural Nicaraguans quickly 
demanded that elites land holdings be confiscated with the land equally 
distributed among the workers and their families. Complete equality in 
distribution, however, is likely to produce a sharply downward shift in 
production as small farms are cultivated primarily to produce food for 
consumption by the families who live on them. In such a scenario, the 
economy is unable to produce the export crops necessary to obtain foreign 
capital. Without hard currency from abroad, the Sandinistas would not only 
be unable to make payments on the huge foreign debt, but unable also to 
import the capital goods it needed for reconstruction. 32 Any failure to 
redistribute land, however, would surely destroy the the new government's 
credibility and jeopardize the mass support needed to facilitate social and 
economic recovery. 
The immediate response was the confiscation and nationalization of the 
1,500 estates (encompassing two million acres of land) owned by the Somoza 
family and its closest allies. This symbolic act of popular will was the first 
step not only toward land distribution but also through moving toward 
34
 
agrarian reform. A state agricultural sector was formed under the direction 
of the newly created Ministry of Agricultural Development and Agrarian 
Reform (MIDINRA) which was charged with the administration of all 
Sandinista agrarian policy. 33 The MIDINRA quickly implemented a new 
collective system of community-run estates assembled from the confiscated 
Somoza holdings which were well-equipped for the processing of agroexport 
crops. Rural families joined cooperatives that provided them not only with 
land to farm, but also with the mechanization needed to harvest and process 
their crops, however out-dated the machinery was. Through increased 
levels of agrarian reform the Sandinistas hoped to raise the rural standard 
of living, make the country self-sufficient in food production, and increase 
the agroindustrial base to produce more foreign exchange income. 34 
Despite their immediate program of land distribution, however, 
two-thirds of all agricultural land would remain the property of owners 
wealthy enough to employ laborers to work it. By allowing these land 
holders to retain ownership of their property, Sandinista leaders hoped to 
maintain the support of the middle and upper-middle classes by protecting 
their interests in spite of marxist policy changes; a practice for which they 
would later be criticized. On the assumption that these lands would remain 
productive in private hands and maintain the agroexport economic base, the 
MIDINRA officials made a conscious effort to negotiate with the middle-range 
land holders. 35 Another source of policy input came from the Rural Workers 
Association (ATe), a coalition of over 80 farm labor unions with 60,000 
members. Its main goals were to assist and advise the revolutionary 
government in constructing a program of agrarian reform that would maintain 
pre-1979 production levels and to establish a peasant movement founded on 
Sandinista principles. 36 
35 
In the interest of these two campesino-related objectives for agrarian 
reform, the MIDINRA launched its second reform policy initiativein 1981, a 
program of increased farm mechanization partly as a response to a labor 
shortage that had developed after the civil-war. The plan involved the 
large-scale employment of mechanical harvesters, but only on cotton fields as 
they could not be used on the rugged terrain of the coffee plantations. 
Unfortunately, mechanization was not widely successful because in addition to 
its limited harvesting capabilities, the machinery had to be imported, thus 
absorbing Nicargua's minimal foreign exchange earnings. As cotton prices 
fell on the international market during the early 1980s, importation of 
expensive machinery and the depletion of the country's capital represented 
an increasingly dysfunctional set of circumstances. 
The third major Sandinista agrarian reform policy was the BEP 
(Batallones Estudiantiles de Producci6n) voluntary labor program announced 
in 1983. Volunteer laborers were recruited from government offices, 
workplaces, and particularly from schools and universities. Like the 
Literacy Crusade, the BEP program depended on the success of nation-wide 
mass appeal to form a collective effort for the 1984/85 harvest. The program 
relied heavily on moral incentives as it did not produce any significant 
material incentives. Because of tremendous social pressure to join, however, 
over 20,000 students volunteered their labor to further the goals of the 
revolution. 37 The program was relatively successful in harvesting many of 
the crops that would otherwise have been left to rot in the fields. Such a 
high level of volunteer support, however, could not be sustained (especially 
in 1985 with the increase in Contra attacks on farm workers). 
Sandinista agrarian reform achieved its greatest successes between 1979 
and 1984 with the mixed-model agricultural sector producing its highest 
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growth rate of 15 percent in 1983. Its major shortcoming, however, was its 
failure to develop a viable policy solution to the problem of landless 
campesinos who were not members of cooperatives. After 1984, frequent 
Contra attacks began to seriously affect levels of agricultural production and 
to discourage landless peasants from joining state farms and cooperatives for 
fear they would become victims of counterrevolutionary violence. 38 Levels of 
output decreased throughout the period of Contra activity in the countryside 
until the 1987 cease-fire, and continued sporadically thereafter. 
Furthermore, the agrarian reform was unable to achieve food self-sufficiency 
despite import substitution, export diversification, and production policies. 
The agrarian measures, therefore, carried more subjective value in their 
ability to gain popular support, volunteer labor, and cooperation from 
workers organizations. In objective terms, Nicaragua's continued reliance on 
exporting coffee and cotton and its failure to produce the expensive 
products it imported ultimately doomed the Sandinistas to economic failure. 
Although the industrial sector had traditionally been of little 
significance when compared with its agricultural counterpart, it had met with 
rather encouraging gains during the 1960s. This was due largely to its 
ability to export goods to the CACM and to the investment in manufacturing 
by the Somocista elites. 38 Industry suffered a major slump during the 
1970s, however, as worldwide economic recession shrunk the regional market 
for the country's manufacturing exports. The decade of the seventies also 
brought civil war that damaged and destroyed a large segment of the 
industrial base. Industrial production had virtually ceased during the last 
several months of the insurrection given that much of the fighting during 
the Final Offensive was carried on between the National Guard and factory 
workers-turned urban guerrillas on the streets of Managua and other 
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industrial centers. 40 Nevertheless, Sandinista leaders were confident that 
their economic recovery plan could rebuild manufacturing and develop a 
strong profitable industrial sector for the new society. They hoped to 
attract foreign and domestic industrial investment in order to begin immediate 
recovery. That great infusion of international investment never materialized. 
Much like their early agrarian program, the initial Sandinista industrial 
prokram involved large-scale expropriation. In the months follwing "The 
Triumph", 30 percent of the country's manufacturing sector was nationalized 
although, because of later concessions made with the bourgeoisie, the 
proportion of privately-owned industry remained at a constant level 
throughout the 1980s. 41 The revolutionary government also initiated state 
industrial investments that created urban jobs and unemployment was 
reduced from 28 percent in 1979 to 17 percent in 1980. Initial FSLN policy 
during the period following the victory did manage to produce a respectable 
12 percent gain for industrial production in 1980, but it was unable to 
repeat this feat in the years following. As a result, urban employment 
figures for 1989 were nearly the same as they had been ten years earlier 
during the insurrection. 42 By the mid-1980s the situation for both state and 
private-owned manufacturing firms was dismal with little chance of 
improvement given the growing military expense and destruction incurred by 
the regime as a result of the Contra war and the increasingly bleak future 
for the attraction of additional investment. 
The Sandinista industrial plan was never able to achieve the kind of 
objective or subjective gains that occurred in the agrarian and social 
sectors. Perhaps the single greatest obstacle to industrial growth was the 
utter lack of investment, foreign or domestic, to rebuild, update, and 
expand existing facilities. The private industrial sector within Nicaragua 
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was reluctant to invest in the post-revolution economy because of its 
inherent instability and dependence. 42 Another factor was the serious 
shortage of foreign exchange needed to import the machinery, supplies, and 
raw materials that Nicaragua was unable to produce. These factors, 
together with the lack of anticipated foreign investment produced little hope 
for prosperity. Finally, the state-owned manufacturing sector revealed 
serious weaknesses in Sandinista policy because even though some industries 
were owned by the government, they operated in a free market without a 
system of strict economic planning. The Somozas' factories had been 
confiscated, but could not be made to run efficiently. A system of state-run 
firms that produced goods unable to compete with private enterprise on the 
free market obviously could not create the "mixed economy" for which the 
Ministry of Industry had hoped. 43 Consequently, Sandinista industrial 
program came to be characterized by dysfunctional policy and revolutionary 
failure. 
In addition to the major domestic barriers to economic reconstruction 
and recovery, post-revolutionary Nicaragua was soon faced with a variety of 
international constraints as well. In the early 1980s, just as the new society 
was beginning to emerge, the legacy of foreign domination and intervention, 
especially from the United States, returned to haunt it. Nicaragua did 
develop beneficial economic and political ties with Cuba stemming from the 
pre-revolution relationship between the FSLN and Fidel Castro as well as 
from similar ideological goals and objectives. Immediately following the 
Triumph, Cuba responded with large-scale humanitarian aid sending food, 
medical supplies, and hospital personnel to relieve the war-torn nation. 44 
Total aid from the Cubans between 1979 and 1982 totaled $286 million in 
emergency economic and technical assistance which was used for health,. 
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education, reconstruction, industrial development, and infrastructure. In 
fact, the most significant international economic commitment to 
post-revolutionary Nicaragua was that made by Cuba. 
The Sandinistas also cultivated an economic relationship with the Soviet 
Union from which they received additional emergency aid, economic 
assistance, and trade. 45 This assistance accelerated markedly in 1981 after 
the U. S. economic boycott was announced; in that year Nicaragua was 
granted $50 million in Soviet trade credits in order to import much neede 
machinery. Soviet aid increased during the deacde of Sandinista rule and 
some sources claim that Nicaragua received almost one million dollars per day 
in trade credits and material goods. When combined with supplemental aid 
from Cuba, estimates of Eastern Bloc humanitarian, economic, and military 
assistance for the 1980s reached one billion dollars per year. 46 
Aid from communist governments, however, carried a heavy price. 
Beginning in 1981 the United States commenced a major nine-year effort to 
destabilize the Nicaraguan economy in the hopes of bringing down the 
Sandinista government. In April of that year, President Reagan announced 
his decision to terminate aid to Nicaragua thereby dashing all hopes of 
receiving the $75 million aid package approved by the Congress less than six 
months earlier. 47 Also in 1981, the Reagan administration set into motion its 
plan to prevent the post-revolutionary government from trading 
internationally, therefore hastening the regime's collapse and ordered aU. S. 
economic blockade of Nicaragua. 48 The U. S. imposition of sanctions 
worsened as the decade progressed and in 1985 Reagan ordered a total 
embargo on U. S. trade with the country. In addition to trade sanctions, 
the U. S. forced the termination of loans from the World Bank and the 
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Inter-American Development Bank in an effort to produce rapid economic 
collapse. 49 
The most crippling U. S. economic policy did not come in the form of 
sanctions, however; it was manifest in the U. S. -engineered Contra war 
against Nicaragua. For the already fragile economy, the cost of fighting a 
nearly eight-year insurgency was devastating not only in terms of human 
lives and money spent, but also in lost productivity. The CIA-sponsored 
couterrevolutionary attacks began in 1982 and escalated steadily until 
fighting reached the level of full-scale civil war by 1984 and was sustained 
for almost four years. In addition to committing a major portion of its 
already-limited budget resources in an attempt at relieving the dire economic 
situation, by 1986 the Sandinista government was spending 50 percent of its 
treasury on anti-Contra defense. Compounding this enormous depletion of 
the annual GDP was the drastic reduction in commodities production. 50 By 
1984 Nicaragua had lost over $285 million in agricultural production due to 
the war as state-owned collectives became the repeated victims of Contra 
attacks that resulted in the burning of thousands of acres of cultivated land 
and the killing of the campesinos who worked on it. Over 40,000 
Nicaraguans were killed in the U. S. proxy war, a huge loss of human 
resouces for a nation of only four million people. 51 The Contra strategy was 
particularly damaging to the country's infrastructure, much of which had 
only recently been rebuilt following the war for liberation. 
Although U. S. sanctions and international economic pressure did 
succeed in cutting off substantial amounts of income for the Sandinista 
government, trade sanctions were largely mitigated because of increased aid 
from Cuba and the Soviet Union. The economic effects of U.S. Contra 
policy, however, proved to be extremely damaging. Production levels fell 
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dramatically during the 1982-85 period of the most intense fighting and the 
need for defense spending continued to escalate. Sandinista political 
economy could not withstand these continued pressures and by the time an 
initial cease-fire agreement was made, the Nicaraguan economy was in ruins. 
By the late 1980s, the Nicaraguan economy was experiencing tremendous 
domestic and international pressure that called for the imposition of drastic 
policy changes in an attempt to avert total economic collapse. In 1988, 
President Daniel Ortega announced a series of radical policy shifts including 
austerity measures and a significant departure from earlier socialist rhetoric. 
By the time the emergency program was developed total output of the 
economy had dropped below the output levels of the 1960s, per capita income 
had fallen 17 percent since the 1979 victory, and unemployment had reached 
23 percent. The always serious problem of decapitalization persisted and the 
treasury was forced into printing cordobas to the extent that the annual 
inflation rate had reached an incredible 20,000 precent by 1988. 52 The 
Sandinista policymakers had no choice but to implement an austerity plan 
that was ultimately criticized not only for its ideological shift but also for its 
objective failure. 
The most significant policy shift came with the announcement of the 
program of concertaci<~n (convergence), literally the uniting of politics and 
economy to accomplish the single goal of post-civil war recovery and 
reconstruction. In practical terms, the plan involved defining the 
boundaries of the different economic sectors and their participants, as well 
as obtaining the cooperation of representatives from the government, 
industry, agriculutre, and labor. 53 Through compromise on such issues as 
wage and price controls and competition between public and private sectors, 
the govenrment hoped to stimulate production and control inflation. 
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· /Specifically, and most controversially, concertaclOn called for the 
introduction of market mechanisms, the reduction of state economic 
intervention, and more government cooperation with capitalist groups. Ortega 
and other leading Sandinistas soon came under attack, however, both from 
the organizations on the left, and from the middle sectors as it appeared 
that the latter groups' ability to survive in the mixed economy was becoming 
increasingly unlikely. Critics from the left charged that concertacibn 
involved the forfeiture of socialist goals, while the more laissez faire factions 
viewed it as a plan to divide private interests in favor of more socialist 
measures. 54 
In addition, more conventional austerity plans were put in place that 
year. The harsh reform package included the reduction and eventual 
cessation of government subsidies for the consumption of imports through a 
multiple exchange rate structure. Although this caused the consumer price 
of imported goods to soar and forced the rationing of some commodities, it 
did reduce the fiscal deficit. The plan decreased government spending 
across the board including defense, health, and social welfare, and the 
reduction of capital investment for development. Finally, the government 
instituted strict monetary reform and devalued the cordoba first by 3,000 
percent in February, then by 9,000 percent in June. 55 The early optimism 
of the Ministry of Planning for economic reorganzation had given way to 
economic disaster. It had become painfully obvious that despite the 
significant gains made in the areas of social welfare, the revolutionary 
economy of the "new Nicaragua" had been a failure. 
Political Conditions and Policy 
The political climate of the envisioned "new Nicaragua" represents one 
of the clearest examples of departure from the more typical political culture 
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characteristics under the Somocistas. The Sandinista revolutionary movement 
was founded on principles related to a freer and more equitable 
socio-political system for the mass base, including access to the basic 
necessities for survival and, in general, humane treatment of Nicaraguan 
citizens. Their primary vehicles for achieving these goals were mass-based 
political, social, and labor organizations that united under the banner of the 
Sandinista Front to overthrow Somoza. Following the Triumph, these 
organizations become the channels of participation through which the people 
took part in the new society. Human rights moved to the forefront of 
political concerns in the wake of the overthrow of a 46-year regime of 
repression and brutality. This was a primary concern for many Nicaraguans 
and the Sandinista leaders who wanted to make a clear break with the past 
and focus on reconstruction rather than revenge. 
They were generally supported by the Catholic Church which, in 
general shared the Sandinista goal of creating a more equitable society. 
Particularly in the initial three years of the revolution the FSLN and the 
Church enjoyed a mutually beneficial relationship not often found in marxist 
revolutionary systems. In foreign policy, the Sandinistas hoped to close ·the 
chapter on their legacy of dependency and initially pursued an official policy 
of non-alignment. The new government made a conscious effort to portray 
their ideology and policy as a fundamental rejection of those of the Somoza 
dynasty. Political participation following the Triumph was based on the 
concept of poder popular (popular power) which stressed mass-based 
participation through grass-roots organizations, worker control of farms and 
factories, and government consultation with the leaders of these groups. 56 
Such practices were absolutely forbidden under Somoza but necessary for the 
Sandinistas if they were to maintain wide popular support. Farm labor 
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organizations like the ATC were consulted by the MIDINRA on agrarian 
policy issues and CAUS (the major trade union) gave policy input to the 
Ministry of Industry. Although the Sandinista government was not 
recognized as a liberal democratic system, its leaders initially demonstrated 
their commitment to pluralism and the will of the majority in the elections 
held in 1984. 57 Given their history of authoritarian military dictatorships, 
there was no cause or tendency on the part of the Sandinista leaders to 
attempt to set up a liberal democratic system. The governing junta was 
acutely aware of the general demands of the majority of the largely agrarian 
and poor population: agrarian reform and freedom from oppression. The 
most effective means to deliver these immediate needs, therefore, was to 
co-opt the support and advice of the organizations to which the people 
belonged. 
In the initial years of the revolution when the Sandinistas popularity 
was very high, most of the mass-based organizations were affiliated with the 
FSLN party. By the mid-1980s, however, as opposition to the Sandinistas 
grew, the number of parties across the ideological spectrum increased over 
twenty. Sa Fully confident in the support of the people, the governing junta 
promised to hold elections by 1985. Under the Law of Political Parties, the 
revolutionary government recognized opposition parties as legitimate and gave 
them the right of competitive political participation for the first time in 
Nicaragua's history. Elections were held in 1984, and with 75 percent of 
registered voters participating the FSLN received 66 percent of the 
presidential vote and 63 percent of the votes for the National Assembly, 
reinforcing their claim to a mandate. 59 Despite the Reagan administration's 
accusation that the FSLN had prevented the participation of any effective 
opposition party, most evidence suggests that the withdrawl of the opposition 
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was more a function of U. S. pressure and incentives than Sandinista 
coercion. 
The movement away from majority participation came not in the absence 
of elections or the restriction of participation, but in the government's 
growing need to protect itself from the encroaching Contra threat. In 1983 
General Ortega and the members of the junta declared a state of emergency 
in response to increasing counterrevolutionary attacks, fearing they would 
be overthrown before elections could be held. Although the anti-Sandinsita 
press was censored, freedom of speech restricted, and arrests increased, 
most of those detained were accused of directly supporting 
counterrevolutionary activity, and therefore, presented a legitimate threat to 
the survival of the government. 
In light of the Contra presence and subsequent civil war, the 
revolutionary government was confronted with a contradictory dilemma of its 
commitment to human rights and the preservation of internal security. In an 
early attempt to demonstrate their effort to prevent the recurrence of the 
atrocities committed under the Somozas, the junta invited representatives of 
Amnesty International and Americas Watch to survey their regime. They 
received quite favorable reports particularly in comparison to the 
U.S.-backed governments of their neighbors in Guatemala and El Salvador. GO 
These organizations did raise questions, however, about the military's use of 
short-term detainment of individuals suspected of subversive activity. 
Notably absent was the government-condoned torture, execution, and 
disappearances that had characterized the activity of the Somocista National 
Guard. One of the first actions of the new government was to abolish the 
death penalty. Even those National Guardsmen convicted of murder, rape, 
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or torture were given only the maximum sentence of 30 years in prison, and 
the vast majority had been released or pardoned by 1989. 61 
The Sandinistas faced a major social and political obstacle concerning 
the maintenance of internal security and law enforcement among the general 
population. Following the 1979 Triumph, Somoza loyalists and remnants of 
the Guard remained a potential source of counterrevolutionary violence, 
although most had fled across the borders to Honduras and Costa Rica. In 
addition, most of the people were heavily armed after the insurrection and 
crime levels were high immediately following the July victory. The 
revolutionary government was inexperienced in police functions but instituted 
several measures to combat the security problem. FSLN patrols were 
ordered to rid the country of remaining Somocistas forcing them to go into 
exile or be imprisoned. A national campaign of depistolization was begun to 
reduce the number of civilians owning and carrying weapons. Hundreds of 
police officers were fired for using excessive force and foreign experts were 
brought in to train those remaining in the performane of their duties in a 
humane and effective manner. 62 
Human rights and internal security concerns grew as the civil war 
fighting intensified between 1984 and 1987. Although the government 
Eje'rcito Popular Sandinista (EPS) was forced to employ increasingly 
repressive tactics in order to maintain the government in the face of an 
overthrow and put down counterrevolutionary activity, the majority of the 
most flagrant violations of human rights were reported to have been 
committed by the Contras. Of course the government could not prevent all 
individual acts of excessive violence or cruelty, but the Sandinistas did 
uphold their commitment to maintaining a humane society and never resorted 
47
 
to the death squads and executions employed by other governments fighting 
insurgents in the region. 
Discussion of the position of the Church and religion during the 
Sandinista period largely consists of the relationship between the 
revolutionary government and the two segments (official and popular) of the 
Catholic Church. The Church and its followers were a formidable force in 
the revolution as parish priests and campesinos contributed a great deal to 
the opposition movement either by taking up arms themselves, or by 
speaking out to others who would. Even the official hierarchy, despite its 
traditional alliance with the Somoza family elite and its commitment to the 
status quo, sided with the movement against the dictator in the interest of 
social justice and their followers living in abject poverty. Following the 
Triumph, however, the Church experienced an internal division over support 
for the marxist system that was emerging. This split had important 
implications for the Sandinistas in a country where the Church remained a 
significant political force with considerable influence in society. 
The people's, or popular Church's primary vehicles of revolutionary 
activity were the Christian Base Communities (CEBs) endorsed by the 
bishops as a means of bringing religion into the revolution. The Base 
Communities were engaged in social welfare activity, and their members' 
actions in the revolutionary movement were communicated to the bishops in 
order to keep the latter abreast of developments, especially in more rural 
parishes removed from the urban-based hierarchy. 63 At the official Church 
level, the relationship between the hierarchy and the emerging Sandinista 
government was mutually cooperative. In fact, in 1979 then-Archbishop 
Miguel Obando y Bravo, the official leader of the Nicaraguan Catholic 
Church, and his Council of Bishops publicly endorsed the new government, 
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in return for which the Sandinista leadership assured Church officials that 
the regime's commitments would not threaten their religious institutions. 64 
The following year, the FSLN ratified the "Document on Religion" which 
guaranteed complete religious freedom and the party also appointed several 
Church officials to positions within the new government. The Church-State 
alliance was short-lived, however, as the official Church became the 
international target of anti-Sandinista efforts. Both the Vatican and the 
U. S., particularly the CIA, developed ties to Cardinal Obando y Bravo 
during the early 1980s. Under Pope John Paul II, the Vatican pursued an 
international policy designed to discourage nuns, priests, and other 
ecclesiastical officials from engaging in political activity or taking positions in 
governments. This policy was aimed at a more progressive development in 
Latin America as a whole, liberation theology, in which Church officials 
became active advocates for the poor and members of revolutionary 
movements. Such had been the case in Nicaraguain the post-Second Vatican 
Council era. 
In 1983 the Pope visited Nicaragua and expressed his displeasure with 
liberation theology urging Nicaraguan Catholics to join the movement of 
Cardinal Obando y Bravo who had become the head of the Catholic opposition 
to the Sandinista government in accordance with the wishes Vatican 
wishes. 65 As for Washington's relationship with the hierarchy, the CIA and 
right-wing religious groups financially supported the activities of Church 
officials and used the Contras to exploit the religious issue, internationally 
portraying the Sandinistas as left-wing persecutors of the Church. The 
government was in fact, rather tolerant of criticism from religious leaders, 
save for its efforts to censor the zealous remarks of Cardinal Obando y 
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Bravo and the expulsion of a bishop for lobbying the U. S. Congress in 
support of Contra aid ..... 
These pressures from Washington and Rome widened the split between 
the popular Church and its followers and the Church hierarchy and the 
Vatican. Most parish-level Church officials ignored orders from above and 
continued their work in popular volunteer efforts for the country's 
reconstruction and beyond. Most of the political damage to the Sandinista 
government by the Church, therefore, came at the international level where 
opposition to the regime used the Church issue to foster multilateral support 
for the counterrevolutionary effort. This conflicting policy has actually been 
more politically damaging to the Catholic Church as many of its members, 
especially in poor areas, grew weary of the religious infighting and 
converted to various rapidly growing evangelical sects. 
As was the case in the domestic political arena, Nicaragua's foreign 
policy represented a clean break with the legacy of the Somozas and almost a 
century of domination by the United States. The junta made clear its official 
policy of non-alignment, although its economic relationship with Cuba and the 
Soviet Union would later suggest a lapse in this commitment. As the decade 
progressed, the Reagan administration's position moved from antagonistic to 
open hostility until it became known that the United States was funding the 
Contra insurgency in an attempt to overthrow the Sandinista government. 
Fueling their nine-year conflict was the Sandinistas regional policy of 
providing material and diplomatic support to leftist guerrillas in EI Salvador 
and Guatemala fighting against the U. S. -supported, right-wing military 
government. This novel foreign policy by a once-vassal state was in fact, a 
major cause of U. S. intervention through the Contras that severely weakened 
the Sandinista regime. 
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The nearly nine-year series of actions that would constitute U. S. 
Contra policy was largely a function of President Reagan and his top 
administration officials' preoccupation and obsession with ousting the 
government that had thrown out Somoza. Contra policy began in November 
1981 when Reagan announced his support for counterrevolutionary forces, 
initially comprised of exiled National Guardsmen based in Honduras. 67 This 
policy was declared in response to persistent intelligence reports of 
Sandinista assistance to leftist guerrillas in El Salvador. Although the FSLN 
National Directorate later debated such aid to its Central American neighbor 
for almost a year and emphatically denied any support for them, by late 
1980, the Sandinistas made one of their first and most crucial major foreign 
policy decisions, the sending of weapons to the Salvadorans. 6a This action 
was all the justification that hardliner anti-communists in the Reagan 
administration needed to justify huge aid package proposals for the Contra 
forces. 
The Contra insurgency forces, based primarily in Honduras, served as 
the proxy army of the United States in its undeclared war on post-Somoza 
Nicaragua. They received a total of $390.7 million in direct U. S. 
government aid, assistance through the illegal "Iran-Contra" National 
Security Council network, and U. S. insurance and loans between 1982 and 
1989 despite Congress' temporary halt on all aid to the Contras in 1984 and 
its indefinite ban on military aid. aa Attacks on Nicaragua began in force in 
1982 and continued through 1987. The heaviest and most damaging 
offensives occurred in 1983 and 1984 when sea and air-based attacks on vital 
economic infrastructure and industry were carried out, including the 
internationally denounced CIA-engineered mining of Nicaraguan harbors. 70 
Much of the damage sustained in these attacks was irreparable as the 
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Sandinista government was forced to allocate greater percentages of its 
severely limited budget to fight Contra ground battles in the Honduran 
border region. 
The U. S. Contra policy was economically and morally exhausting for the 
Nicaraguan regime. Although the insurgency effort was rendered powerless 
once U. S. aid was severed, the government continued to struggle and 
founder with the economic, social, and political problems caused by the war 
up until the time of their electoral defeat in 1990. It is unlikely that the 
Sandinistas' foreign policy could have prevented U. S. intervention through 
the Contras had they refrained from fostering friendly relations with the 
Soviet bloc or refused to aid the Salvadoran guerrillas. At most, their 
foreign policy agenda accelerated the inevitable attack by the United States 
that compelled the Reagan administration to pursue Contra policy more 
zealously and with more support from ultra-conservative domestic elements in 
the United States. At any rate, Nicaragua was again faced with the task of 
reconstruction when military operations were suspended in 1988. 7 ' 
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CONCLUSION:
 
THE SANDINISTA FAILURE AND THE FUTURE OF NICARAGUA
 
Foreign Policy and the Contra War 
Sandinista foreign policy, .particularly with respect to its result in major 
warfare with the Contra forces, heavily damaged its credibility and ability to 
survive. Yet, its decision to send military aid to EI Salvador, while it did 
incite the wrath of the Reagan administration, may have appeared as a 
realistic solution to the problem of the real or perceived Central American 
right-wing threat to its fragile security. The new government was fully 
aware that remnants of the National Guard and Somoza Debayle himself 
remained just over the Nicaraguan borders. Seeking a leftist revolutionary 
ally in EI Salvador, the Sandinistas made the decision to aid guerrilla forces 
there, perhaps reasoning that such a relationship would be necessary to 
protect itself from counterrevolutionary threats in the region. At any rate, 
the Salvadoran policy did serve as a red flag for the U. S. to unleash its 
Contra policy against the Sandinistas. Nicaragua's ties to Cuba and the 
Soviet Union served a similar function in internationally labelling Nicaragua 
as a potential communist satellite and a vehicle for Communist expansionism 
in the Western Hemisphere. 
Legacy of Monocultural Economics and Dependency 
The most plausible explanation for the failure of the Sandinista regime 
is that they were unable to transform their economy to the same degree that 
they had been able to transform the social and political arenas. A new 
Nicaragua had begun to emerge with revolutionary policies that produced 
significant gains in education, health care, and housing. Political reform 
had transformed the country from its existence as the virtual Somoza family 
kingdom into a revolutionary polity with increased political participation and 
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societal freedoms. Ten years after the Triumph, however, Nicaragua 
remained a monocultural economy subject to the vagaries of the international 
market. The inability to produce necessary finished goods compounded their 
dependency as they were forced increasingly to import expensive industrial 
products they could ill-afford. Huge foreign trade imbalances left the 
economy trapped in a state of dependency with their only source of income 
being subject to the whims of the agroexport market. 
The government was hard pressed to decide whether to fulfill FSLN 
promises relative to its revolutionary commitment giving Nicaragua's 
campesinos the land they had fought for in the insurgency or to invest its 
scarce monetary and policy resources in industry. While the industrial 
sector held the country's only prospect for economic diversification and 
decreased dependence on foreign buyers, supporters of the revolution 
wanted land to farm and assistance from the government to do so. Fearing a 
great loss in credibility, the Sandinista government opted for the more 
politically favorable, but much less economically prudent policy of 
distributing land to rural peasant farm workers and implementing a crude 
agrarian reform at the expense of an underdeveloped industrial sector. 
Their agrarian policy absorbed its precious hard currency resources on 
inefficient farm machinery for agroexport crops. Although these resources 
could have been invested in industry and economic diversification, they 
instead perpetuated Nicaragua's dependence on its major export crops. 
A major economic goal of the revolution was to break the historic 
socio-political legacy of dependency. A decade later, however, Nicaragua 
remained dependent primarily on coffee, which today accounts for at least 50 
percent of its export revenues annually. Efforts to produce cotton and 
other export crops only superficially changed the equations. The 
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Sandinistas did in fact break their historic dependent relationship with the 
United States, only to shift that dependence to Cuba and the Soviet Union; 
the players changed but the game did not. This dependency continued to 
leave Sandinista Nicaragua's economy subject to market trends that precluded 
long-term stability. Sustained economic chaos ultimately overshadowed 
successes in other areas and ultimately led to the Sandinistas' downfall. 
1990 Elections and Violeta Chamorro 
At a glance it seems almost ironic that ten years after great masses of 
Nicaraguans took up arms to overthrow the Somoza dictatorship and the 
elitist, personalistic system it stood for, the nation would embrace Violeta 
Barrios de Chamorro, Dona Violeta, as their hope for the future. The 
daughter of a wealthy cattle rancher, educated in the U. S., and the widow 
of La Prensa editor Pedro Joaqu{n Chamorro, she appeared at face value to 
be an unlikely candidate for the presidency of a revolutionary society based 
on marxist principles. Like her husband, Mrs. Chamorro had been a 
long-time leader in the intellectual and upper class opposition to the 
Somozas, a supporter of the revolutionary movement, and a founding member 
of the FSLN governing junta. For a people heavily influenced by myth and 
tradition, she embodies the spirit of her late husband and the fight against 
Somoza oppression that elevated him to both symbol and hero through the 
period of the revolution to the 1990 election. Violeta Chamorro's own 
personal conviction compelled her to leave the junta after less than one year 
over her disagreement with their plans for a more controlling and orthodox 
Marxist regime, and her staunch opposition to press censorship. She 
returned to La Prensa where she continued to speak out against limits on 
free speech and provided a voice for opposition to the Sandinista government 
despite its repeated attempts to shut the newspaper down.' Dona Violeta 
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and her supporters forged the 14-party coalition that became the National 
Opposition Union (UNO) in the summer of 1989, promising to bring economic 
and political liberation to a people who had grown weary of civil war and 
desperation. UNO collected a resounding 55 percent of the vote in the 1990 
election despite international predictions of another Sandinista victory. 2 
The UNO administration moved quickly to restore civil liberties and 
reduce the size of the army in an attempt to solidify popular support. 
Despite Dona Violeta's enormous personal popularity, however, the first year 
of her presidency was riven with political and economic crisis. As the 
president of the ATC expressed that group's position, " ... you can't eat 
freedom of expression." Labor unrest over generally desperate financial 
conditions for all Nicaraguans resulted in a May 1990 strike and riot of civil 
servants less than one month after the election. 3 In September 1991, 
controversy raged over legislation that called for the return of property 
given away in desperation by the Sandinistas before they formally turned 
power over to the UNO government. Although Chamorro vetoed the bill and 
called it unconstitutional, her UNO supporters began to question her ability 
to withstand pressure from the still prevalent Sandinistas opposition. It 
appeared as though her presidency had become a political balancing act 
between her coalition and the ousted Sandinistas. 
Economically the Nicaraguans remain in a desperate situation. Although 
the U. S. immediately lifted its embargo and promised to renew economic aid 
after the Chamorro victory, decreased aid from the Eastern Bloc will leave 
the nation's huge debt unpaid. President Chamorro declared her country 
bankrupt in May 1990 seeking an emergency loan from the United States. A 
steady negative percentage change in the GNP from 1984 on, and an inflation 
rate of 35,000 percent by 1989 left the new government with a meager $3 
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million in the national treasury at the time of the inauguration." The hope 
of heavily increased private investment remained unfulfilled as investors 
feared the instability of Nicaragua's economy and the threat of another civil 
war. Despite the initial support for the UNO government, the patience of 
the people appears to be virtually at an end. After ten years of economic 
and political turmoil, the vast majority of Nicaraguans are desperate for a 
government that can bring about peace and financial stability. With the 
current worldwide recession and general decline of foreign aid from wealthier 
nations. the probability of rapid improvement is not terribly great. In spite 
of their personal admiration for Dona Violeta, Nicaraguans may again decide 
"to vote their stomachs, not their hearts. ".. 
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